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Abstract
Euroscepticism or opposition to the European Union has become a growing political philosophy
among broad segments of Europe’s populace. This philosophy has manifested itself in some
form throughout most of the European Union, but opinion polls and voter data indicate
Euroscepticism is most acute within the United Kingdom and both among its general citizenry
and elected officials. In the 2009 EU Parliament elections for the United Kingdom, the right
wing United Kingdom Independence Party gained its most ever seats in the Parliament while the
far-right British National Party gained its first ever seats in a national election. With overtly
Eurosceptic political parties gaining unprecedented support, the UK is poised to enter a new
chapter of Euroscepticism. This thesis examined the spatial variation of Euroscepticism in the
three constituent nations of the Isle of Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales). In this
analysis, several key socio-economic variables such as lack of education, unemployment rates
and low population density were found to strongly correlate with Eurosceptic voting behavior
whereas geographically the region identified as the most Eurosceptic was the West Midlands and
the least Eurosceptic was Scotland. This work focused mainly on the 2009 EU Parliament
election at both regional and local scales in England, Scotland and Wales, as well as local
council elections in England from 2007 to 2010.
Key words: Euroscepticism, Euroskepticism, Great Britain, European Union, United Kingdom,
political geography, British.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

“Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of
common purpose, but it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions,
Parliamentary powers, and sense of pride in one's own country.” –Excerpt from
Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges speech” to the College of Europe in 1988.
Throughout modern human history, the need to transcend domestic boundaries and form
supranational organizations has periodically been a unifying force among nations with cultural
and linguistic differences but similar economic, military or political motivations. Historically
Europe has been the center of this movement toward supranationalism and supranational
organization. For example, the world’s oldest extant international organization, the Central
Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR), is located in Europe. Founded following the
destruction of the Napoleonic Wars, the CCNR was intended to encourage European prosperity
by guaranteeing security for navigation across the international borders that divide the Rhine
River area. This tradition became more pronounced as European countries played key roles
during the formation of supranational organizations like the United Nations and NATO.
In the wake of violent fascist movements and the ravages of two world wars during the
first half of the 20th century, Europeans began searching for methods to bring about a more
united Europe and end the constant quarreling among the various states. Beginning with some
simple trade agreements, their efforts eventually led to the European Union (EU), a supranational
organization that was renowned for its efficiency and as a model of international cooperation.
1

Most of the world has viewed the European Union as a great pillar of cultural and
political stability with the notable exception of the current economic and political turmoil in
Greece and other countries. In stark contrast to today’s peaceful and orderly European Union,
historic international organizations and empires in Europe have been forged through regional and
sometimes global conflict such as the Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, the more recent Greater
Germanic Reich and the Warsaw Pact. In contrast, this idea of a European democratic
confederation encompassing twenty-seven countries ranging from Ireland in the west to Cyprus
in the east is a relatively new and revolutionary idea in global politics.
The EU is not some spontaneous and trivial creation but one years in the making. As
mentioned previously, the basic premise of the EU’s foundation was to discourage conflict and
promote economic cooperation among European nations. At this time most of Europe was
emerging from the deadliest conflict in human history, World War II. French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman, one of the founding fathers of the EU, summed up the early idea of European
integration in his 1950 declaration:
Five years, almost to the day, after the unconditional surrender of Germany,
France is accomplishing the first decisive act for European construction and is
associating Germany with this. Conditions in Europe are going to be entirely
changed because of it. This transformation will facilitate other action which has
been impossible until this day. Europe will be born from this, a Europe which is
solidly united and constructed around a strong framework. It will be a Europe
where the standard of living will rise by grouping together production and
expanding markets, thus encouraging the lowering of prices. (Europa.eu,
Schuman Declaration 1950)
2

Schuman’s declaration later led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in 1951 via the signing of the Treaty of Paris. It should be noted that coal
and steel are symbolic as they were two of the main materials of warfare during this time.
Schuman desired to place the production of coal and steel under a “High Authority” to regulate
and promote coal and steel production of France, Germany and any other European countries
that desired to join. Officially the aim of the Treaty, as stated in Article 2, was to create a
common market (a group of countries imposing few or no duties on trade with one another and a
common tariff on trade with other countries) for coal and steel that would promote economic
expansion, lower unemployment and raise overall standards of living. Thus, the ECSC had to
ensure a steady supply to the common market by ensuring equal access to the sources of
production, the establishment of the lowest prices and improved working conditions. All of this
cooperation had to be accompanied by growth in international trade and modernization of
production. (Europa.eu, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community)
Figure 1.1. The Six Founders of the European Coal and Steel Community
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The High Authority of the ECSC took office first on August 10, 1952 in Luxembourg.
The Authority aimed to be an independent, supranational executive checked by a Court of
Justice. There were concerns about this sort of power, leading to the creation of a Council and
Common Assembly (later named European Parliament in 1962) to be created to act as a
counterweight. Jean Monnet, the originator of the ECSC, was chosen as the President.
The general idea behind the ECSC was to merge the coal and steel industries of select
European countries and remove any trade barriers between them and hold them accountable to an
international body outside of any sort of direct national control. Thus, war would be made
impossible by taking control of two of most important ingredients of armed conflict, coal and
steel. However, not every democratic country in Europe opted to join the ECSC as unique
situations and circumstances affected those that did not. The United Kingdom (UK), for
example, was perhaps the most prominent country that decided not to join. During this time, the
UK had just completed a nationalization of the coal and steel industry and the ruling Atlee
Labour Government feared losing control of these valuable industries.
Based on the success of the ECSC, the member countries furthered European cooperation
by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which established the European Economic Community
(EEC) and further established a common market. In the preamble, the signatories of the Treaty
declare that they are
…determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, affirming as the
essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements of the living and
working conditions of their peoples,
4

…recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition;
…anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various
regions and the backwardness of the less-favored regions;
…desiring to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
…intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas
countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
…resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and
liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join
in their efforts... (Europa.eu, Laws and Legislation, Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, EEC Treaty - original text)
The EEC had become fully functional by 1958. Moreover, another institution, the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), created at the signing of the Treaty
of Rome (1957), became fully functional at this time. The EAEC was founded with the purpose
of creating a specialized market for nuclear power in Europe, developing nuclear energy and
distributing it to its member states while selling the surplus to non-member states. These newly
formed communities had executive bodies that were referred to as commissions, as opposed to
“High Authorities.” These commissions were headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, a city that will
become the center of EU policy decisions. The reason for the change in name was the new
5

relationship between the executive body and the Council. Some countries had reservations over
the power of the High Authority and some wished to limit it by giving more power to the
Council rather than the new executive (http://www.cvce.eu/, 2012). Thus, the European
Commission came into effect as the executive body of the three communities. Shortly thereafter,
tensions began to erupt in the early 1960s with France seeking to limit supranational power and
rejecting the membership of the United Kingdom. By 1967 however, the Merger Treaty (Treaty
of Brussels) came into effect and three communities were merged into a single entity, the
European Community (EC) the forerunner of the EU.
In 1970, the EU Parliament was given power over the budget of the EC. Shortly after, the
EU made its first steps toward enlargement by adding Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
in 1973. By 1979, the first election for Members of European Parliament (MEPs) had occurred.
Prior to this election, MEPs were chosen by the Parliaments of their nations and not direct
elections by citizens. The Parliament should have been elected well before this under the Rome
Treaties, however issues concerning the method of voting arose and the direct election of MEPs
was delayed until 1979. The European Parliament has three places of work, Brussels, Belgium;
Luxembourg; and Strasbourg, France. Luxembourg is home to the administrative offices whereas
meetings of the whole Parliament take place in Strasbourg and in Brussels.
All of these treaties and commissions would later coalesce and culminate in the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. This treaty laid the foundation for the 27 member European
Union we know today. The EU has grown from a somewhat insignificant group of six Western
European trade partners to one of the most power entities in the world, with nearly 500 million
inhabitants and ranking first in the world in GDP measured in purchasing power parity (IMF
World Economic Outlook Database, 2012).
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The Maastricht Treaty established some important precedents but perhaps none more so
than the creation of the Euro as the multi-national currency of the EU. It should be noted that not
every EU member state adopted the Euro as its currency. Sweden (de facto opt-out of Euro
usage) and the eastern EU members have not yet done so but are obliged to adopt the Euro
within the near future whereas the UK and Denmark have specific opt out clauses allowing them
to keep their pre-membership currencies. From 1979 until the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the UK’s
political scene was dominated by the Conservative Party under the leadership of Prime Minsters
Margaret Thatcher and later John Major. Mrs. Thatcher was fiercely anti-Euro as was most of
her party. This political climate coupled with an event known as Black Wednesday of 1992 (in
which the UK lost nearly five billion dollars (3.4 billion pounds) after the government was
forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
after the government was unable to keep it above its agreed lower limit) culminated in the UK’s
rejection of the Euro (Tempest, 2005). In the case of Denmark, the Danes rejected the Maastricht
Treaty at first on the basis of monetary independence and other social and defense related
matters. The Danes did eventually ratify the Maastricht Treaty but with several opt-out clauses
notably an exemption from using the Euro.
With financial collapse ensuing throughout southern Europe, the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty has forced several larger more influential EU members to make important
concessions in order to save the Eurozone from possible economic ruin. With reckless spending
and short sighted government policy permeating the Mediterranean member states (Greece, Italy,
and Spain), more stable Northern European nations like Germany and the United Kingdom have
been forced to spend unprecedented amounts of money to rescue their EU comrades from
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economic depression. These events have only further spurred the causes and positions of
Eurosceptic parties across Europe.
What and Where is Euroscepticism?
Euroscepticism is a relatively recent term. The term first appeared in an article published
in The London Times in 1985 (Harmsen and Spiering, 2005, p. 127), as the completion of the
common economic market was the main item on the EU agenda. The term became a part of
everyday political discourse after Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges speech” to the College of Europe
in Brussels in 1988 (Leconte, 2010, p. 3). In this speech, Mrs. Thatcher laid out her long term
vision for the EC while proclaiming, “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the
state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state
exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Gifford, 2008, p. 104). This speech was made to
the pro-EU college of Europe and essentially laid out Thatcher’s view of a less centralized
European Union. Although the term Euroscepticism is relatively recent, the meaning of
Euroscepticism has varied over time. Opposition to European integration in 1957 mainly implied
opposition to the setting up of the common market but by contrast opposition to the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992 amounted to hostility toward political integration (Leconte, 2010, pp. 4-5).
Theories on the causes of Euroscepticism vary substantially. One of the most often cited
theories is the idea of a “democratic deficit” within the EU. This idea postulates that EU
institutions lack democratic accountability when compared to the national governments of EU
member states. The EU suffers from a lack of democracy and appears inaccessible to the
ordinary citizen because its method of operation is so complex. Furthermore, various studies
have pointed out a lack of significant elections in the EU, insufficient deliberation on EU policies
as the EU is not often debated publically and there is little indication of Europe-wide debates on
8

the EU (De Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz, 2010, p. 10). Conversely, when viewing
supranational institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nations, the EU
could be seen as having a democratic surplus in comparison to these institutions.
National discourse on European integration is another often referenced cause of
Euroscepticism. How the EU is debated in the public arena affects the overall sentiment toward
the European Union. Moreover, national narratives deeply impact views on the European Union
(such studies incorporate speeches by politicians, media reporting and even more symbolic and
less political portrayals of Europe, such as in literary novels, school books and art). For example,
Medrano Diez (2003, p.158) theorizes that Germans are more likely to be pro-EU as a path for
redemption from the brutality of World War II. It is a way to not only redeem Germany in the
eyes of other Europeans but also to find a new legitimate identity in contrast to their militaristic
past. Conversely, in the UK, much like Germany, the memory of World War II is still fresh, but
this time for different reason. The EU is often portrayed as a threat to UK independence, just like
Nazi Germany was in WWII. War language is regularly used around European summits; for
example, when British Prime Ministers continue to be compared to Winston Churchill or Neville
Chamberlain depending on how well they are perceived to defend British interests. Terms such
as “invasion” are frequently used when discussing future EU legislation (De Wilde, Michailidou
and Trenz 2010, p.7). Other authors such as Arato and Kaniok (2009, p. 57) put forth more
generalist causes for Euroscepticism such as phobias on a loss of sovereignty and identity, end of
the nation-state, a total sale of the economy to foreigners and fear of a loss of newly won
statehood.
Whatever the case, Euroscepticism is a very dynamic term. It is compatible with any
movement be it left or right that opposes European integration. The term is also quite often used
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as a disparaging term by political rivals. One of the most famous Eurosceptics is Czech
President Vaclav Klaus. Instead of referring to himself as a Eurosceptic, he labels himself a
“Eurorealist” or “Eurocritic” to avoid seeming like a radical fringe politician. Within the
European Union several political parties exist with an expressly anti-EU agenda. Many of these
are parties occupying the extreme ends of the political spectrum such the far-left Communist
Party of Greece and Nigel Farage’s right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
which gained nearly 17% of the vote in the 2009 European Parliament elections in the UK,
coming in second to the Conservatives and ahead of the Labour Party in third.
In a 2009 Eurobarometer public opinion poll on the EU, the United Kingdom came in
close to last in nearly every category of EU satisfaction with only 20% of UK respondents
believing things were going in the right direction in the EU and a mere 28% saw their country’s
membership as a good thing. In a 2009 Eurostat survey of residents of all 27 EU member
countries on levels of confidence in European Union institutions, the UK came in last with an
astonishingly low 21% of residents voicing confidence in EU institutions. The nearest country
was Latvia with 38% confidence (http://ec.europa.eu/). There tends to be no obvious spatial
consistency to EU opposition on a national level. Based on the 2009 Eurobarometer survey
support was lowest in Latvia (23%), the UK (28%), and Hungary (32%) while highest in
Luxembourg (79%), the Netherlands (72%) and Spain (71%) (Eurobarometer 71, Public opinion
in the European Union, 2009, p. 91)
Euroscepticism is not uniquely a British concept but Great Britain was and still is the
geographical heartland of this philosophy. It not only signifies an opposition to the European
Union but an opposition to all things European. Great Britain’s distinctive geography as an
island has allowed it to remain somewhat independent and residents commonly identify
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themselves as the least “European” of all the European Union members. Euroscepticism takes
many forms and exists in many European Nations but to reiterate, Euroscepticism largely
originated within the United Kingdom and remains most intense among its residents. This thesis
will explore the political mechanisms that propel Euroscepticism in Great Britain and how these
mechanisms vary geographically across the island.
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature
Why is the UK so Eurosceptic?
The United Kingdom is frequently cited as being the EU member state with the lowest
levels of public support for continued EU membership (Anderson and Kaltenhaler, 1996, p. 184;
Eurobarometer, 2009; Leconte, 2010, p.70-71). Many theories have been formulated to explain
this uniquely high level of opposition by the British public. Some theories, mostly
environmentally deterministic in nature, incorporate the idea that the UK has a certain unique
geography isolated from mainland Europe and a post-imperialist identity that has led to problems
of modernization and international integration. Charles de Gaulle summed up this idea in a 1963
press conference explaining why he vetoed the UK application for membership to the EEC:
England in effect is insular, maritime, bound up by its trade, its markets, its food
supplies, with the most varied and often the most distant countries. Her activity is
essentially industrial and commercial, not agricultural. She has, in all her work,
very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature, structure,
circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other
continentals. How can Britain, in the way that she lives, produces, trades, be
incorporated into the Common Market as it has been conceived and functions?…
It is predictable that the cohesion of all its members, which would soon be very
large, very diverse, would not last for very long and that, in fact, it would seem
like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction,
and that is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly
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European construction (Press Conference by President de Gaulle, Paris, 14
January 1963).
Chris Gifford (2008, pp. 15-16) theorizes the British problem with European integration
is “explained in terms of the failure of and the continuation of institutions and policies associated
with imperialism.” Gifford further postulates the British economy was too interlinked with its
overseas colonies, and consequently not enough was done to build up the domestic economy.
Once Britain entered a post-imperial trajectory, the country was forced to address problems of
decline. As such, further European integration was seen as vital to addressing this problem.
Against this backdrop, the pursuit of membership of the European Community seemed vital to
the domestic economy. It represented a liberal strategy of economic modernization aimed at
improving the competitiveness of the British economy by exposing it to the market forces of a
European common market. Increased European integration would provide the necessary impetus
to stimulate Britain’s international Fordist companies and form the basis to reinvigorate the
British economy (Overbeek 1990, pp. 100-101). This problem of British modernization was
fundamental to the decision by the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan to apply
for membership in the early 1960s.
Lauren McLaren (2002, p. 554) expands upon this theory by suggesting support is lowest
in the UK because citizens view EU membership as a threat to national identity. She argues that
a resilient national identity is a formidable obstacle to European integration as it is likely to
foster Eurosceptic attitudes. Hooghe and Marks (2003, p. 15) stress the impact of an “exclusive
national identity” on the negative perception of Europe. In the exclusive national identity
hypothesis, citizens feel attachment to their nation and not to Europe.
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Drewry (2007, p. 113) theorizes that the main problem with British Euroscepticism is the
challenge further European integration poses to deeply ingrained administrative cultures in the
UK. He proposes that British public administration is permeated by a “traditional antipathy
towards legalism in public administration and public management” (i.e., the British oppose a
strong reliance on formal legal rules and procedures; more informal approach to Common Law
traditions). Leconte (2010, p. 148) goes on to point out the UK has been built on an antilegalistic model which was built in direct opposition to the French administrative model which
relies on multiple administrative codes and legal rules. The unique legal model employed within
Great Britain exemplifies the British fear of possible contamination of British institutions by the
bureaucratic traditions of continental European countries.
Party Based Euroscepticism in the UK
Views of European integration are quite nuanced within the United Kingdom’s multiparty democracy. Although some politicians buck party trends and vote against party interests,
the Conservative Party and the UK Independence Party are commonly accepted as the major
anti-EU players in British politics whereas Labour and the Liberal Democrats are the major proEU parties. The Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour Party are the three most
prominent political parties within the politics of Great Britain while once fringe parties such as
the UKIP and the British National Party (BNP) are steadily gaining prominence.
The Labour Party is traditionally the most left-wing of the three major parties and grew
out of the many working class revolutionary movements of the nineteenth-century Industrial
Revolution. In general the Labour Party has championed the rights of the poor and ethnic
minorities. The Party first came to power in 1924 and had a very historically significant landslide
victory in 1945, ousting then Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Since the event, the Labour
14

Party has cemented its place within British politics as the party of government from 1964 to
1970, 1974 to 1979 and 1997 to 2010. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats have occupied an
important part of left-wing politics in the UK, but the roots of this party can be traced back to the
seventeenth-century. The party in its current form is 25 years old but its origins lie with the
Glorious Revolution power struggle between the monarchy and Parliament in the late
seventeenth-century. The Liberal Democrats are descendants of the Whigs who advocated the
legitimacy of Parliament over the power of the Monarchy. The Whigs became the Liberal Party
in 1859 and by 1906 the Party had won a landslide election victory under the leadership of David
Lloyd George who ushered in many reforms including state pensions and the national insurance
system. The Party had begun to decline by the 1920s due to internal policy division. A major
turning point for the Liberal Party occurred in 1981 when disgruntled Labour Party MPs left the
party to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP). By 1988, the waning Liberal Party had struck
an agreement with the newly formed SDP to form the Liberal Democrat Party, a center-left
party.
Like the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives trace their roots to the Glorious
Revolution of the seventeenth-century. Dissimilarly though, the Conservative chose to uphold
the supremacy of the King during the revolution. Moreover, the Conservatives were called
“Tories” at this time, an Irish Gaelic term denoting their loyalty to the King. In the early
nineteenth century, members of the party began forming “conservative associations” and in 1831
the first known use of the name “Conservative” as a description of the party appeared (MerriamWebster Online, 2013). Since then the party has primarily been known as the Conservatives but
the Tory designation is still sometimes used. The Conservatives dominated British politics
between World War I and World War II and have been the party of government and the
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dominate center-right party, holding power from 1951-1955 and 1979-1997.
It is possible for members of all three major parties to be supporters or opponents of the
EU, yet it is almost always assumed Liberal Democrats and Labour Party politicians and voters
favor EU integration at higher rates than their Conservative counterparts. For example in the
Labour Party’s manifesto, the official party position on the European Union is: “Our belief is
that Britain is stronger in the world when the European Union is strong” (Labour Manifesto
2010, 10:4). Likewise the Liberal Democrat position is as follows: “The Liberal Democrats have
a proud track record as the most consistently pro-European party in British politics. For many
years, we have argued that the European Union serves both the UK national interest and the
wider European interest” (Liberal Democrats Policy Consultation, Europe, 2013). Conversely,
the Conservative position on Europe is more ambiguous but nonetheless promotes a Eurosceptic
position: “We are committed to playing a leading role in the EU and protecting the UK's
national interests, but the EU needs to reform to meet the challenges of competitiveness, a stable
Eurozone and greater democratic legitimacy” (Conservatives.com, Where We Stand, Europe,
2013). Conservatism has historically displayed mixed feelings about further European
integration (Stephens, 1996, p. 90). Free-trade liberalism has been a guiding principle of the
modern Conservative Party and has prompted the party to engage in trade agreements with
continental Europe. Yet socially, the Conservative Party has been the vanguard of traditional
cultural and political values of Great Britain.
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Figure 2.1: Left-Right Political Spectrum of Select UK Political Parties

As a whole, the center-right to right-wing parties are more nationalistic and protectionist.
As such, they often see further EU integration as a threat to traditional British values. These
parties tend to view membership as detrimental because they fear their country’s destiny will be
controlled by a supranational organization instead of UK citizens. The Conservative Party has
frequently had to reconcile this dichotomy between the potential economic benefits of EU
membership and a fear of the potential loss of traditional British values. During the EU’s
infancy, the former position dominated and the Conservatives were eager to join the European
Economic Community. Nonetheless, most within the party have always believed the party must
at least take a pragmatic stance and have at least opted for a voice at the table in Brussels.
Mistrust of further EU integration by the Conservatives is often attributed to
Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her early opposition to a single European
currency. Mrs. Thatcher’s view has been somewhat vindicated as she correctly predicted that a
single currency could not simultaneously meet the needs of hugely differing economies such as
that of Germany and Greece (countries she specifically named). She believed attempting to
merge the two would lead to disaster for the smaller European nations. “It will devastate their
inefficient economies,” she cautioned then pro-euro chancellor, John Major, in 1990 (Oborne,
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2010, para.4).
The creation of EU citizenship was another controversial aspect of the Maastricht treaty.
EU citizens have the right to free-movement; for example, a citizen of France can freely travel to
UK and take up residence without any restrictions (Maastricht Treaty, Article 21). As with the
opposition to the single currency, Mrs. Thatcher led this charge against EU citizenship as well by
declaring a double allegiance of sorts would exist. She stated in a 1993 speech to the House of
Lords: “If there was a citizenship you would all owe a duty of allegiance to the Union. There
would be a duty to uphold its laws. What will happen if the allegiance to the Union comes into
conflict with allegiance to our own country?” (Koslowski, 2000, p. 128). These policies are at
odds with the sometimes anti-immigrant policies of the UKIP and to a lesser extent
Conservatives.
In essence, Euroscepticism in the UK is typically associated with center-right to rightwing political parties like the Conservative Party and UKIP respectively. However, it should be
noted that left-wing Eurosceptic parties, most notably the Green Party of England and Wales,
have made strong gains in British elections. The Green Party bases much of its Euroscepticsim
on fear of European policy making being dominated by corporate interests whereas the
Conservative Party is more concerned with a loss of traditional English values. Furthermore, it is
theorized that usual Conservative Party voters may support the rapidly expanding UKIP in EU
Parliament elections as a means of protesting further EU integration (Cutts, Ford and Goodwin
2010, p. 420 ). UKIP’s credentials as a legitimate party of right-wing protest over Europe may
make it a “polite alternative” for voters angry about rising immigration levels or elite corruption
but who are repelled by the stigmatized image of the more extreme BNP which, as polling data
reveal, has struggled to portray itself as a credible political choice (Cutts, Ford and Goodwin,
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2012, p. 206).
The UKIP was founded on 3 September 1993 at the London School of Economics by
members of the Anti-Federalist League, which was founded by Dr. Alan Sked in November 1991
with the aim of fielding candidates opposed to the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 general election.
The UKIP was merely a fringe party in its early days, being overshadowed by the larger and
better financed Referendum Party which became a non-factor after the 1997 General Election.
The UKIP’s first success came in 1999 when it secured 7% of the vote and won its first three
seats in the European Parliament. It built upon prior electoral success in 2004, winning twelve
seats and pushing the Liberal Democrats into fourth place. Today the UKIP is a robust party with
eleven seats in the EU Parliament, three seats in the House of Lords and 51 local councilors. The
UKIP position on the EU is much sterner than that of the Labour, Liberal Democrats and
Conservatives: “The British people must decide through an immediate referendum if we stay in
the EU or to come out and claw back independent power over our national life. We do not have
to be ruled by this regime to work with our European neighbors who depend on us for their
markets” (UKIP Policies, What We Stand for, 2010, para.7). Moreover, those in the UK
Independence Party, voters and MPs, are overwhelmingly assumed to be explicitly EU
opponents.
Although the UKIP is seen as extreme by many, it does not occupy a far-right political
position. The British National Party (BNP) however does occupy this position. The BNP is the
most peripheral of all the major anti-EU parties within the UK, but it does have legitimate voter
support. The BNP was formed in 1982 by John Tyndall, a co-founder of the National Front, who
spent time in jail in the 1960s for inciting racial hatred. Today, the BNP is expressly antiimmigrant and anti-EU, but its new leader Nick Griffin has sought to tone down the racist
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reputation and broaden its voter base (telegraph.co.uk, Factbox: British National Party, 2006).
Although the BNP is normally painted as a party for fringe voters and fascist
sympathizers, the party has had some recent electoral success holding two of the UK’s EU
Parliament seats and three local council seats. In its 2010 Party Manifesto, the BNP’s statement
on the EU is as follows: “The BNP demands an immediate withdrawal from the European Union,
which is an organization dedicated to usurping British sovereignty and to destroying our
nationhood and national identity.” It is further theorized that the three previously mentioned
parties and all center-right to right-wing parties across Europe share one thing in common, an
opposition to “new politics” or issues that appeared on the agendas of Western Governments in
the 1960s: inter-ethnic relations and immigration, gender equality, rights of sexual minorities,
reproductive rights and environmental protectionism (Inglehart, 1977). The more a party holds
conservative and authoritarian views of “new politics” the more likely it is to be Eurosceptical
(Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002, p. 985, Kriesi, 2007, p. 94). Moreover the right is fueled by
a new populism and the anguish many citizens experience in the more traditional, underperforming sectors of the economy as a consequence of rapid globalization and Europeanization
(Collignon and Serrano, 2007, p. 2). Conversely, mainstream center-left to left parties tend to be
more pro-Europe. Mainstream center-left to left parties are more pro-EU due to a combination of
reasons but mostly, these parties tend to carry a more cosmopolitan voting base which typically
favors further EU integration. Centrist ideology predisposes one to pro-Europeanism because the
often consensual nature of the EU typically produces centrist outcomes (Leconte, 2010, p.108)
The Labour Party and Liberal Democratic Party of the UK could be seen as more centrist than
left-wing thus explaining the correlation between Labour and Liberal Democratic support and
pro-EU attitude.
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Interestingly the far-left is typically as Eurosceptic as the far-right. In the case of the UK,
far-left parties have played a much more minor pole in politics than far-right parties. Yet it is
worth mentioning that parties such as the Communist Party of Britain would object to EU policy
on the basis that it is neo-liberal, capitalist and undermining the European welfare state (Leconte,
2010, p.109). Furthermore Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, p.7) categorize EU opponents as
either “hard” or “soft” Eurosceptic. They additionally define hard Euroscepticism as where there
is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration. Hard Eurosceptic parties believe
their counties should withdraw from membership, and frequently support policies toward the EU
that are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is
currently conceived. Hard Euroscepticism is a vital element of this thesis. Because parties that
meet the hard classification seek to completely withdraw from the EU, an analysis of their voting
base and spatial clusters are good metrics for assessing the geography of Euroscepticism. Soft
Euroscepticism is defined as where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration
or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the
expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national interest” is
currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory. Soft Euroscepticism is of less importance in this work,
because the voters composing soft Eurosceptic parties are more ambivalent on the EU issue and
as such soft voters are a less definitive metric.
Cecile Leconte (2010, p. 5) notes that hard and soft Eurosceptic parties make up nearly
one-fifth of the EU’s electorate and they composed over 40 percent of the electorate in the 2010
General election (BBC 2010 Election Results). Leonard Ray (2007, p. 12) finds that hard
Eurosceptic parties typically tend to be right of center or far left or far right whereas soft parties
tend to be left of center or right of center and overall more centrist. In UK politics, the

21

Conservative Party and the Green Party of England and Wales are the two best performing soft
parties while the UK Independence Party and the British National Party are the two best
performing hard parties as of the most recent European Parliament Elections in the UK (2009).
Additionally, past research into Euroscepticism indicates voters view “second-order
elections” such as the EU Parliament Elections as less consequential (Heath et al., 1999, p. 389).
Voters in general may view these second-order elections as a chance to place protest votes
against the existing ruling establishment thus prompting voters to vote for smaller parties with
sometimes extremist political positions. Reif and Schmitt (1980, p. 5) assert that the national
elections, such as the General Election in the United Kingdom, are priority number one in
European nations. These elections could be termed “first-order.” The most important distinction
between the two orders is that in “first order” elections more is at stake or at least the voters and
parties involved believe more is at stake. Reif and Schmitt (1980) further argue that the one
defining feature of second order national elections is that less is at stake and this view is shared
by the main actors in the political process, the voters, the parties and the media. Because there is
less at stake, the public at-large expects reduced benefits from second-order elections thus
prompting fewer people to turn out. Therefore, European Parliament elections could be viewed
similarly to mid-term U.S. Congressional elections, German Landtagswahlen, British House of
Commons by-elections, and local elections throughout the democratic world (Anderson and
Ward, 1996, p. 447).
Ultimately, a plethora of issues have been discussed by many scholars as causes for
Eurosceptic behavior. No definitive factor has yet been identified as a cause of predisposition
toward Eurosceptic beliefs. This thesis will endeavor to explore a small segment of the theories
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regarding this philosophy with voting behavior, geographic location, ethnicity, education and
income forming the crux of the discourse.
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Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Study Area and Data Collection and Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methods used to analyze the spatial and
socio-economic differences in Eurosceptic voting trends throughout the Isle of Great Britain and
the data sources used to perform the analysis. This chapter begins with an in-depth description of
the study area, as well as the political subdivisions and voting processes within each subdivision.
The introduction and explanation of voting processes is followed by the description and sources
of data used and the methods employed to analyze that data. It is important to note that only the
Island of Great Britain and its constituent regions were examined (England, Scotland and
Wales). Euroscepticism does exist within Northern Ireland but this country was not examined
because the major political parties of Great Britain are almost non-existent within the politics of
Northern Ireland. In essence, an overall different political climate exists in Northern Ireland
compared to the constituent countries of Great Britain, so to keep the analysis consistent,
Northern Ireland was not examined.
The primary metric of interest examined was electoral performance of major hard
Eurosceptic parties in the most recent UK European Parliament Election held in 2009. “Major
hard” is defined as parties who acquired at least one seat in the final EU Parliament election
results and parties who have a clear anti-EU message. Analyzing hard parties is a better metric
for describing voter preference as it is generally clear why a voter would cast a vote for the most
prominent hard Eurosceptic parties; a vote for these parties most likely signifies dissatisfaction
with the EU. A total of 72 Members of the European Parliament were elected from the UK using
the proportional representation system (D’Hondt method; discussed later) of the EU.
The 2009 election was historic and unique in many respects. It was the first time a party
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with no representation in the House of Commons gained more overall votes than a party with
representation. The UKIP came in second in total votes ahead of the third place Labour Party
although the two tied for seats taken in the European Parliament. Only the British National Party
(BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) meet both the major and hard criteria previously
discussed. Furthermore, both parties have a clear anti-EU agenda, have memberships in the tens
of thousands and obtained either a local council seat or a seat in the UK’s election for the EU
Parliament 2009. No other UK political party with a clear anti-EU platform meet these criteria. A
further key development in this election was the strong performance of the far-right. Leading the
pack was the BNP which gained its first ever seat in a national election. The BNP is the hardest
of all prominent Eurosceptic parties in the UK. As such, voters who cast ballots for the BNP in
the European Parliament elections were likely casting votes for immediate withdraw from the
European Union. Figure 4.3 below shows BNP vote totals by region.
The performance of these two parties at the regional as well as local council level was
examined. Results for the BNP and UKIP were examined at the local council level in England
and Scotland (UK equivalent of U.S. county) whereas results for Wales were examined based on
Welsh Assembly Constituencies. The difference among the three was due to data collection
methods. Data returns for Wales were collected based upon Assembly Constituencies whereas
Scotland and England’s returns were by council area. The data collection difference is a minor
point but one still worth mentioning.
Performance of these parties in all 326 local government councils in England was also
briefly analyzed. Elections for local councillors in England occurred in either thirds of the
council every three years or the whole council every four years. The election process depends
upon the council type. There are presently five different council types: two-tier “shire counties”
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further subdivided into multiple districts, London Boroughs, Metropolitan Boroughs, Unitary
Authorities and two councils with unique governments of their own kind (sui generis: Isles of
Scilly and City of London). Election results span from 2007-2010. A more longitudinal analysis
dating back to the early 2000s would most certainly be a more accurate measure of the
geography of Euroscepticism but for time constraint reasons this research only examined results
from 2007-2010. The shire county local elections were most problematic in terms of data
collection. Because these counties compile election results based on wards (a sub-level of
districts), each ward vote total had to be accessed and compiled based upon districts. Since the
EU Parliament election returns are based on districts only, the Shire County returns from 2009
did not adequately match the data. Thus, the previously mentioned process had to be performed
to keep data comparison consistent. For example, when analyzing the shire county of West
Sussex, there are seven districts composed of 71 wards. Vote returns for the BNP and UKIP in
local elections had to be accessed from each of these 71 wards, which were then compiled into a
final vote total for each corresponding district.
As previously mentioned, local governments hold elections in different years depending
upon the type. The 27 “shire” county councils (Cambridgeshire, Northamptonshire,
Buckinghamshire, etc.) and eight other unitary authorities elected all their councillors in 2009
concurrently with the EU Parliament elections. The London region elected its council members
in 2010. Councils electing members in thirds had no election in 2009 but held them in 2010.
Results from the 2010 election were used in this case. Furthermore, some unitary authorities had
their most recent election in 2007 or 2008 and therefore the results from these elections were
used. The nine regions of England were also examined individually while Wales and Scotland
are treated as comparable regional units. Regional returns from the EU Parliament election were
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examined against regional demographic variables while local returns from this election were
examined against local council demographic variables. The primary focus of this study was the
nation of England. The nations of Scotland and Wales were examined as well but on a more
subsidiary basis. England has an estimated population of 53 million, Wales 3.1 million and
Scotland 5.3 million (Office for National Statistics, 2012). With this in mind, more analytical
attention is applied to England as it comprises nearly 86% of the population of Great Britain.
EU Parliament voting numbers for BNP and UKIP were derived from the BBC News and
their 2009 election coverage. Local levels results for this election were accessed via a detailed
report provided by the House of Commons Library. Local council data were more problematic to
obtain because they are not compiled in a central database. All 400 local council websites were
accessed and the final vote tally of each party was divided by the total number of votes to
produce a final percentage of the vote. For example, the UKIP obtained 1,000 out of 10,000 total
votes in the Kent Council which translates to a 10% final vote total.
Regional analysis involves comparing final vote percentages for each party with several
different demographic variables ranging from ethnicity to gross value added (the UK’s economic
output measurement). These demographic data were obtained from the 2011 UK Census via the
Office for National Statistics. Scotland collects census data independently from the census of
England and Wales; therefore, census data for Scotland was obtained from the General Register
Office for Scotland. These variables were tested using a simple correlation coefficient test
(Pearson’s r). The Pearson’s correlation assumes that all variables are either interval or ratio
level measurement or that all variables are approximately normally distributed. It further
assumes there is a linear relationship between two variables, outliers are kept to a minimum and
there is homoscedasticity of the data. The following ranges were adapted from J.P. Guildford’s
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Fundamental Statistics in Psychology (1973) and his rule of thumb for interpreting correlation
results used when interpreting correlation results. A positive relationship indicates an increase in
both variables whereas negative variables indicate an inverse relationship with one variable
increasing and the other decreasing:
If r = +.70 or higher Very strong positive relationship
+.40 to +.69 Strong positive relationship
+.30 to +.39 Moderate positive relationship
+.20 to +.29 weak positive relationship
+.01 to +.19 No or negligible relationship
-.01 to -.19 No or negligible relationship
-.20 to -.29 weak negative relationship
-.30 to -.39 Moderate negative relationship
-.40 to -.69 Strong negative relationship
-.70 or higher Very strong negative relationship
Other basic statistical data were obtained from the ONS and used to paint a general
demographic picture of each region. These demographic data were also compared using the
correlation coefficient test with the results of the 2009 EU Parliament election by local council
returns in Scotland and England and by Welsh Assembly Regions. The same process was used
for comparison of the 326 local government districts of England as well. This analysis was
slightly more in-depth in that a paired two sample for means t-test was used to compare the
variation in BNP and UKIP local level results for the EU Parliament election and the local
council elections. The t-test employed assumes population data from which the sample data are
drawn are normally distributed and the variances of the populations to be compared are equal.
28

Several maps were produced using ArcGIS 10. These maps are basic choropleth maps
showing the geographic variations in voter support for the BNP and UKIP as well as other
demographic variables such as language in the case of Wales or survey data on EU opinion
obtained from a 2012 YouGov-Chatham House survey.

29

Chapter 4 Results
4.1 Voter Preference, Regional Variation and Demographic Correlates
A region by region breakdown of the combined total of the BNP and UKIP as a
percentage of final vote tallies is illustrated below in Figure 4.1. The map displays the regions of
England and the nations of Scotland and Wales separately. The major geographical trend of note
is the split between voter apathy for Eurosceptic parites in Greater London, Scotland and Wales,
and voter support for them in the rest of the English regions.
Voter preference for UKIP and BNP European Parliament candidates is highest in the
West Midlands with nearly 30% of voters prefering UKIP and BNP candidates, the North East,
Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, the South West, and the East sported the second
highest levels with 25-28% of voters in these regions opting for Eurosceptical candidates. The
North West and the South East displayed levels of 19-24%. London, Scotland, and Wales were
less prone to choose Eurosceptic candidates with <18% of voters opting for the BNP and UKIP
candidates.
Greater London
Demographic factors likely explain London’s lack of preference for Eurosceptic
candidates. The more cosmopolitan nature of large urban areas is often times more conducive to
the promotion of multi-cultural values. In the case of London, there is a significant presence of
peoples of South Asian and African ancestry, as well a sizeable number of those classified as
“Other White” or those who are White but not British or Irish (i.e. French, German White, etc.).
Based on 2011 estimates from the Office of National Statistics, only 44.9% of London’s
population is White British, the lowest proportion of any major city in the UK. Diversity
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sometimes leads to pro-Labour sentiments and since the Labour Party is pro-EU, the concept of
diversity and pro-EU sentiment go hand in hand. For instance, a 2012 study of British elections
by Dr. Anthony Heath and Dr. Omar Khan at the University of Oxford found that 68% of ethnic
minorities typically vote for Labour Party candidates (Heath and Khan, 2012).

Figure 4.1. Combined BNP and UKIP Support by Region in the 2009 EU Parliament Election
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From a statistical standpoint, there is a strong positive coorelation (r= 0.56, n=326,
p<0.05) between the percentage of White British citizens in a local council administrative area
and the combined vote total for hard Eurosceptic candidates by local council. As racial
homogeneity increases, so does support for Eurosceptic parties. Furthermore, the ten lowest
areas for combined BNP and UKIP support were found in London. The average White British
population for these areas was 39.2% and in seven of these ten boroughs the Labour party has
majority control of the local government council. The Labour Party came in a close second
(21.3%) to the Conservatives (27.4%) in London while the pro-EU Liberal Democrat Party came
in third with a sizeable vote percentage (13.7%). Overall, pro-EU parties were chosen by nearly
40% of the electorate, whereas soft Eurosceptic parties, such as the Tories and Green Party
garnered another 40%, and hard parties (UKIP, BNP) obtained the remaining 20%. Although
four out of ten Londoners may be somewhat skeptical about EU membership, they are not as
supportive of the more radical hard Euroscepticism that is common in other regions England.
Nonetheless, the combined vote total for both hard and soft Eurosceptic major political parties
(Conservative, Green, BNP, UKIP) was high (~54%) in what is generally considered the most
pro-EU region of England.
Curiously, three London boroughs showed some of the highest support for the BNP and
UKIP in all of Great Britian (Figure 4.2). The Outer London borough of Havering had the single
highest combined vote total for the BNP and UKIP in Great Britain with the parties recording a
combined 41% of the vote. The adjoining borough of Barking and Dagenham was the single best
area for BNP support in all of Great Britain at 19.44%. Likewise, the borough of Bexley, just
across the River Thames, was the eighteenth best area of support for the BNP in Great Britain at
12.36%. Commonalities between the boroughs of Bexley and Havering had similar rates of
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White British population at, 77.2% and 83.3% respectively and were the second and most White
British boroughs of London correspondingly (Office for National Statistics, 2011 Census Data).
These boroughs also have similar low rates of economically active persons between the ages of
16 and 74 whom were unemployed at the time of the 2011 census, at rates of 4.4% in Bexley
and 4.5% in Havering. Conversely, the borough of Barking and Dagenham is much more
ethnically diverse with only 49.5% of residents being of White British ancestry. Moreover , the
borough is more economically deprived than the aforementioned Bexley and Havering with
7.3% of economically active persons unemployed in 2011.

Figure 4.2. BNP and UKIP Support in Greater London
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One possible explanation for BNP success in otherwise diverse but economically
depressed areas lies in the fact that these diverse areas are often dominated by the Labour Party.
The BNP has specifically targeted these areas to gain votes from working class White voters who
have lost faith in the Labour Party (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2010, p. 434). In the case of
Barking and Dagenham, the local government council has been controlled by the Labour Party in
every election since 1964; thus, it has been a primary target of the BNP in both EU and local
government elections.
From a geographical perspective, these boroughs are on the periphery of Greater London
and seemingly adhere to a pattern of higher levels of anti-EU voting that occurs on the periphery
of the city. On the north side of the River Thames, beginning with Barking and Dagenham and
continuing east to the English Channel, all local government areas are among the highest rates of
combined BNP and UKIP voting in all of Great Britain (Figure 4.2). Similarly, begininng with
Bexley on the south side of the River Thames and continuing east, high levels (24.71%-30.90%)
of anti-EU voting are seen in all local government areas ending at the English Channel.
The North
Perhaps the most obvious spatial pattern is the strong performance of the BNP in the
Midlands and the North of England (Figure 4.3). The BNP attained support from nearly 10% of
voters in these areas. The BNP’s best individual regions were Yorkshire and The Humber and
the North East. Here the BNP received nearly 10 and 9% of the vote respectively and gained one
out of six seats allocated to Yorkshire and the Humber for the European Parliament. Yorkshire
and the Humber is one of Great Britain’s least developed and least educated regions with only in
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54.6% of students attaining five or more grades at the General Certificate of Secondary
Education (GCSE) level or equivalent including English and mathematics from 2010 to 2011,
compared with 58.4% for the whole of England. Life expectancy in Yorkshire and The Humber
in a three-year period from 2008 to 2010 was 77.7 for males and 81.8 years for females
compared with 78.2 and 82.3 years respectively for the entire UK. These regions also have some
of the highest levels of citizens with no eductional qualifications (academic, vocational or skills
related). The positive correlation between no qualifications by region and combined Eurosceptic
party vote is very strong (r= 0.73, n=11, p<0.05). Additionally, the unemployment rate in
Yorkshire and The Humber stood at 9.3% in the first quarter of 2012, higher than the UK rate of
8.1% and in April 2011, the median gross weekly earnings for full-time employees who were
residents in Yorkshire and The Humber was £466, lower than the UK median of £501 (Office for
National Statistics, 2012, Regional Profile, Yorkshire and the Humber).
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Figure 4.3. BNP Vote by Region

The North West region on the other hand was unique in that its voters seemed to
somewhat rebuff the advances of the far-right. It was one of only two regions along with London
where the Labour Party achieved multiple seats in the final vote total. The region has two very
large urban centers Liverpool and Manchester, which are a bastion for Labour Party support
among the many working class voters.
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Over 87% of the population of the North West live in urban areas, and the region has the
second highest regional population density in the UK at 490 people per sq km (Office for
National Statistics, 2011, Population and Migration, North West). The total electorate of
Manchester and Liverpool stood at 333,535 and 317,947 respectively. The BNP achieved 7.1%
of the 166,424 votes cast in the two largest urban areas in the region, slightly below the BNP
regional total of 8%. In general the North West was one of the regions where the BNP
underachieved and the Labour Party overachieved. Furthermore, the combined BNP and UKIP in
Manchester was 16.1%, well below the regional combined average of 24.8%, and one of the
lowest combined averages outside of London. The North West much like Yorkshire and the
Humber, has below average rates of citizens currently in employment at 68% compared to
70.5% for the UK. However, the BNP did earn enough votes in the region to gain their vanguard
seat. Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party ran for an all important seat in this region
and gained that seat by achieving nearly 8% of the vote using the D’Hondt voting method the EU
Parliament election employs.
In the neighboring North East, the combined vote totals for the BNP and UKIP was
nearly 24%. Similar to the previously analzyed regions, this region lags behind the rest of the
nation in some key economic categories. For instance, household incomes in the North East are
the lowest in England and the unemployment rate was 11.2 %, the highest of all English regions.
The median disposable weekly household income after housing costs in the North East was
£327, the lowest of all English regions in the three-year period 2007/08 to 2009/10 (Office for
National Statistics, 2012, Social Indicators, Nort East). Moreover, the North East was the second
best region for BNP support at nearly 9%.
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The theme of economic underdevelopment and lack of education is a recurring one when
analyzing Euroscepticism.The income variable was chosen to explain regional variations in
Euroscepticism on the basis of previous research that inversely correlates lower income with
preference for far-right parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002, p.364). To analyze why
disadvantaged social groups, like less educated people and low income groups, are more likely to
vote for right-wing parties, specific theories have been advanced, primarily ethnic group conflict
theory, which may be considered most appropriate (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004,
p.16). Ethnic conflict theory builds on real world conflict theories and postulates that
disadvantaged citizens are more apt to vote for far right parties that claim to champion their
economic interests because underprivileged citizens perceive themselves to be threatened by
ethnic immigrants with whom they often have a common socio-economic status (Ivarsflaten,
2005). Historically, these far-right parties have typically promoted nationalism and the
preservation of a specific way of life. These parties sometimes appeal to those who view further
EU integration as a threat to important national intrests (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007, p.5).
Within the regions of England alone, there was a moderate inverse correlation (r= -0.50,
n=9, p<0.05) between the Gross Value Added Per Capita (GVA; the 2010 UK Census measure
of economic output by region) and BNP vote percentage. As GVA decreased, BNP support
typically increased. These findings are consistent with previous research into Euroscepticism
and preference for far-right parties. When Scotland and Wales are added to the correlation test
the correlation is weaker (r= -0.40, n=11, p<0.05). BNP support was moderate in Wales (5.9%)
compared to all other regions of England but extremely low in Scotland at 2.5% of total vote.
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Scotland and Wales
A different set of political circumstances seem to cause the BNP to perform poorly in
Scotland. Scotland has its own nationalist party, the Scottish National Party (SNP). Unlike the
BNP, the SNP is a more moderate, center-left party with a more inclusive message. More
specifically, the SNP seeks Scotland’s independence and does not base its party platform on
restricting immigration or broader ethnic issues as the BNP does. Notably, the SNP can actually
be considered one of the most pro-EU parties within UK politics. The main reason for the SNP’s
pro-EU stance is the desire for Scotland to withdraw from the UK and become a full member of
the European Union, with the Euro as its currency. The SNP was the leading party in Scotland in
the 2009 European Parliament Elections. It can be assumed a vote for the SNP is a vote in favor
of the EU. In fact, in terms of voter preference, Scotland is the least Eurosceptic of all regions of
Great Britain. The SNP, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats, all pro-EU parties, obtained slightly
over 60% of the vote total with soft and hard Eurosceptic parties attaining the majority of the
remaining vote totals. The SNP’s vote share rose by 9.4% since the previous EU election of
2004, the largest increase of any single party in Great Britain.
Within Scotland, there exists an interesting cluster of Euroscepticism along the border
with England (See Figure 4.4.). Interestingly, the geographical theme of border regions showing
extreme levels of support or discontent for the EU seems to hold true for Scotland. This
phenomenon has been noted by Cecile Leconte in her book Understanding Euroscepticism
(2010, p. 84) wherein it is postulated that residents of border regions fear European integration
will increase immigration and competition. Although Scotland and England are not independent
of each other within the EU, it is still worth noting that the border region of northern England
displayed some of the lowest levels of anti-EU voting within the 2009 elections. The border
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regions phenomenon could be a result of increased competition among migrants from
neighboring EU states (Leconte, 2010, p.85). Again, Wales and England are not independent of
each other within the EU and form a single larger state, yet it is still a relevant geographical issue
of consideration. Moreover, residents of peripheral regions may exhibit a fear of becoming
marginalized as a consequence of further integration of core regions in more centrally located
areas of the country into the EU, a pattern evidenced in Scotland. The remote Northern Islands of
Orkney and Shetland display some of the highest levels of support for BNP and UKIP.
Additionally, the remote highlands regions of mainland northern Scotland display higher rates of
anti-EU voting than the mid-Scotland regions where population density is highest.
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Figure 4.4. BNP and UKIP Results in Scotland
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Age is moderately positively correlated with combined support for Eurosceptic parties
(r= 0.35, n=32, p<0.05). One of the strongest indicators of support for the UKIP was percentage
of the population age 50 or older that was unemployed. In council areas in Scotland with higher
percentages of older unemployed residents, support for UKIP was correlated strongly (r=0.42,
n=32, p<0.05). Curiously, there was a strong inverse correlation (r = -0.46, n=32, p<0.05)
between BNP support and those age 50 or older whom are unemployed. Analysis indicates that
older unemployed residents are less likely to see the BNP as a choice for improving their
economic circumstances. Furthermore, the variable education plays only a slight role in
combined support for Eurosceptic parties in Scotland. There is a weak positive relationship
(r= 0.28, n=32, p<0.05) between the percentage of residents with no qualifications by council
areas and combined BNP and UKIP support. However, the relationship between BNP support
and no qualifications is moderate (r= 0.35, n=32, p<0.05). Although the relationship between no
qualifications and BNP support is moderate in Scotland, it still appears to be the best indicator of
support for the BNP in this region. In fact, lower levels of education appear to be the most
accurate predictor of support for the far-right BNP in every region of Great Britain.
Figure 4.5 Correlations Matrix for Scotland

42

Wales, much like Scotland, experienced the same nationalist political situation that
seemed to preclude the BNP from making any electoral progress. The Plaid Cymru (Welsh for
Party of Wales) likely precludes significant support for the BNP. Like the SNP, the Plaid Cymru
is far more mainstream than the BNP, yet it still advocates nationalist policies, albeit left-wing
nationalism. The Plaid Cymru maintains very close links with the Scottish National Party. MPs
from both parties work as a single group within the Houses of Parliament and were involved in
joint campaigning during the 2005 general election campaign. Both Plaid and the SNP are part of
the European Free Alliance party in the European Parliament, a nationalist and regionalist bloc
of parties.
The Plaid Cymru is also pro-EU. The party’s position on the European Union is as
follows: “We are committed to an independent Wales as a full member of the European Union.
We will continue to support further democratic reform of the EU. We are committed to increased
representation for Wales in the EU. This includes a fair number of MEPs for Wales, a European
Parliament office in Wales, a rotating European Commissioner and most importantly, a vote for
Wales in the Council of Ministers” (Plaid Cymru, 2013, International Affairs, para.3). In Wales,
the Plaid Cymru garnered 18.5% of the vote, third behind the Tories and Labour at 21.2 and
20.3% respectively. Furthermore, pro-EU parties (Labour, Liberal Dems, and Plaid Cymru)
obtained 50% of the vote whereas soft Eurosceptic parties (Tories and Green Party) obtained
roughly 27% and hard parties (UKIP, BNP and minor parties) achieved the remaining 23%.
The Welsh, however, display higher levels of Euroscepticism than their Scottish
counterparts. Pro-EU parties seem to perform rather well in local and national elections,
including the EU Parliament elections of 2009, yet opinion polls indicate that the Welsh do not
support continued membership of the United Kingdom within the European Union. For instance,
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in the previously mentioned Chatham House-YouGov 2012 Survey, 51% of Welsh respondents
reported they would vote to leave the European Union if presented a referendum that offered the
option to do so. Furthermore, the Welsh are unlike the Scottish in that the vast majority of
citizens (90%) prefer to remain a part of the United Kingdom (walesonline.co.uk,2012) whereas
the independence debate in Scotland has escalated to the point of a referendum on independence
to be held in 2014.
In essence, a strange dichotomy exists here; on the one hand, voters prefer to at least be
represented by pro-EU parties in the EU Parliament, but on the other hand opinion polls indicate
most Welsh citizens oppose the UK’s membership within the EU. To explain the contradictory
nature of Welsh voters, one must examine the internal politics of Wales. Wales was granted
regional devolution in 1998 by the Government of Wales Act of 1998, and the creation of a
Welsh assembly occurred shortly thereafter. At this time, the Labour Party of Wales spearheaded
the campaign for devolution along with the Plaid Cymru, the Liberal Democrats (Pro-EU
Parties), trade unions, and several church groups. The only major party to oppose this was the
Conservative Party (BBC.co.uk, Politics 97, para.5).
The politics surrounding devolution likely led to dominance of the Labour Party in Welsh
politics. Every First Minister and First Secretary of Wales since devolution has come from the
Labour Party. Furthermore, Labour has had a majority government in every election of the
Welsh Assembly since devolution. As a consequence, the Conservatives severely impaired any
future political success they might have in Wales. The devolution event, coupled with regional
support for Plaid Cymru could explain why the Conservatives somewhat underperform in the EU
Parliament elections in Wales. For example the Conservatives gained 21.2 % against a national
total of 27.8%, whereas Labour over-performed compared to the UK as a whole with 20.3% in
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Wales and 15.7% in the national total. Similar to England, Welsh Assembly constituencies with
higher percentages of non-White citizens had lower rates of combined BNP and UKIP support in
the EU election. The correlation was much weaker here (r= -0.26, n=45, p<0.05), but nonetheless
an inverse relationship exists between Eurosceptic support and higher numbers of minority
residents. Likewise, the relationship between no qualifications and support for Eurosceptic
parties was weak but nonetheless still positive (r= 0.28, n=45, p<0.05). The relationship between
BNP support and no qualifications was again strongly positively correlated (r= 0.52, n=45,
p<0.05). Figure 4.5 displays the combined performance of the UKIP and BNP within Wales in
the 2009 EU election.
Within Wales, age seems to play much less of a role in Eurosceptic party support,
especially among older populations. In England, the relationship between UKIP support and
those over age 65 was very strong, while in Wales it was almost non-existent (r= 0.08, n=45,
p<0.05). BNP support was a much stronger variable in Wales. Areas that had fewer residents of
retirement age had higher rates of BNP support. The correlation was strong and inverse (r= -0.43,
n=45, p<0.05). The correlation between support for both parties was weak and inverse (r= -0.13,
n=45, p<0.05). As the retirement age population increased, support for Eurosceptic parties
decreased. Perhaps the most unique and interesting variable in Wales was the percentage of
Welsh speaking residents and support for the Eurosceptic parties. The relationship between
Welsh speakers and support for Eurosceptic parties was strong and inverse (r= -0.43, n=45,
p<0.05). Figure 4.7 below displays the spatial distribution of Welsh speakers by assembly
regions of Wales. Spatially, regions closer to the coast and the northwest of Wales have higher
rates of Welsh speakers. Likewise, the percentage of Eurosceptic vote is typically lower in the
coastal and northwest areas. Areas along the border with England and the South of Wales have
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fewer Welsh speakers and more Eurosceptic voting tendencies. This correlation is not surprising,
however, given the fact that the Plaid Cymru is heavily dependent on Welsh speakers and its
power base is typically the western seaboard of Wales. The Plaid Cymru is generally pro-EU;
therefore, it stands to reason that areas with higher rates of Welsh speakers would in turn be
areas with less Euroscepticism and vice versa.

Figure 4.6 Correlations Matrix for Wales
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Figure 4.7. Knowledge of Welsh Language by Assembly Region. Source: Welsh Assembly.

Figure 4.8. BNP and UKIP Support in Wales
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Southern England and the East
Returning to the regions of England, an obvious lack of BNP support exists in the South
East and South West. The South West interestingly is the UK’s oldest region with 19.6% of the
population over the age of 65 (Office for National Statistics, 2011, Population and Migration,
South West). Although there is a great deal of Euroscepticism in this region, parties with a more
fascist message performed poorly. Because this is the region of the UK with highest percentage
of people who can vividly remember the rise of fascism during World War II and its devastating
effects on the British Isles, perhaps this factor causes a lack of support for the BNP, a party with
a fascist history and message. Moreover, older members of discontented social groups who grew
up before the full onslaught of European integration may also be less accepting of EU
membership than those who grew up with the European Union as an accepted part of the British
political arena (Cutts, Ford and Goodwin, 2012, p. 204). The correlation between age and UKIP
support is statistically a strong positive correlation (r= 0.62, n=326, p<0.05) between median age
and UKIP vote percentage by council area. Conversely, the relationship between BNP support
and median age is negligible (r= -0.09, n=326, p<0.05). Instead of supporting Eurosceptic
parties with a more fascist message, South West voters instead chose to support the UKIP in
higher numbers, giving it its best performance in all UK regions (22.1% of total vote) during the
2009 European Parliament Election.
According to a 2012 YouGov-Chatham House survey of 2,078 British adults age 18 to
over 60, when asked the question “If there was a referendum on Britain’s membership of the
European Union, how would you vote?”, only 31% of respondents in these two regions answered
they would vote to remain in the EU, whereas 51% responded they would opt to leave (YouGov,
2013). The survey data indicate the South East and South West regions hold the second highest
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rate of dissatisfaction in all the UK, behind only the Midlands where respondents answered the
aforementioned questions at 26% and 52% respectively. Figure 4.9 displays these results
cartographically. The South East likewise handed the UKIP its fourth best levels of support in all
Great Britain, and furthermore the UKIP was the second most favored party in the region with
18.4% of the vote behind 34% for the first place Conservatives. These two regions also had the
highest voter turnout at 39% in the South West and 38% in the South East.
Figure 4.9 UKIP Vote by Region
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A similar strong UKIP performance result was seen in the East region where the
Conservatives came in first with 31.2% of the vote, and the UKIP achieved 19.6% of the final
vote total. The East and South East are very similar in levels of income (Gross Disposable
Household Income of £16,392 and £17,610 respectively) and percentage of people over 65
(17.5% and 17.2% respectively) (Office for National Statistics, 2011, Population and Migration,
South East) and turnout here was 37%, third behind the aforementioned South and South West.
As such, one could assume a similar vote outcome. Curiously, the East is the fastest growing of
all UK regions in terms of population. By 2021, the population is projected to increase by 10.2%
(Office for National Statistics, 2012, Regional Profile, East of England). Previous research has
indicated that regions that border other nation states are typically either very anti-EU or very proEU (Leconte, 2010). Although Great Britain is an island, and as such borders no other nations,
the East’s close proximity to mainland Europe makes it a prime destination for many European
Union migrants. Between 1991 and 2011, the East was consistently second only to London in
rates of international migration. Nearly one third of the population growth experienced by this
region will result from international migration (Office for National Statistics, 2013, Population
and Migration, East of England)
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Figure 4.10 EU Referendum Survey Results by Region
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The Midlands
Above all, when analyzing the previous regional maps of Great Britain, one region stands
out from all the rest, the West Midlands. The region appears to be the most dissatisfied based on
voter preference. As previously mentioned, income and education are thought to have a strong
influence on support for right-wing parties. The West Midlands is notably the region with the
highest proportion of people with no educational qualification in 2010 with 14% compared with
10.7% for the UK as a whole. The median disposable weekly household income after housing
costs in the West Midlands was £333, one of the lowest of all regions in England within the
three-year period 2007/08 to 2009/10. In the same time-frame, 25% of people (1.3 million) were
in households with incomes below the poverty threshold, one of the highest percentages of all
English regions (Office for National Statistics, 2012, Social Indicators, West Midlands).
Within English local councils, there is a strong positive correlation (r= 0.61, n=326,
p<0.05) between those of have no qualifications and combined UKIP and BNP support.
Statistical tests indicate that localities with higher rates of citizens with no qualifications
typically vote for UKIP and BNP candidates at much higher rates. The correlation is even
stronger (r= 0.73, n=326, p<0.05) when comparing only BNP support with lack of qualifications.
The correlation is much weaker for the UKIP (r= 0.11, n=326, p<0.05) indicating educational
attainment plays a much smaller role in support for the party. This research reinforces previous
findings correlating lack of education and support for extreme far-right parties. The BNP can be
considered much further to the right of the UKIP on the political spectrum; therefore, it stands to
reason that the correlation is stronger for BNP and lack of education than UKIP and lack of
education. Therefore, it seems evident this region would support both the UKIP and the BNP
most of all regions of England. From a geographical perspective, the West Midlands is one of
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only two landlocked regions of the UK (the other being Greater London). The West Midlands’
isolated location, between economically deprived Wales to the West and the rest of England,
perhaps has dealt this region an immediate economic disadvantage and has caused a sort of
withdrawn outlook on EU membership.
The combined vote total for the BNP and UKIP in the West Midlands was nearly 30%.
Likewise the UKIP and BNP performed relatively well in neighboring East Midlands garnering
25% of casted ballots. The East Midlands has similar rates of lack of education and poverty as
the West Midlands. It has below average levels of qualifications and one of the lowest
proportions of 16-year-olds remaining in education. As of 2010, the percentage of the population
who qualified at level 4 or higher of the National Qualification Framework (NQF) was 27.6 %,
compared with the UK average of 31.6 %. The percentage with no qualifications was 11.8 %,
similar to the northern regions but lower than West Midlands (14.0 %). The proportion of 16year-olds in post-compulsory education and government-supported training in 2009/10 was 88%,
tied for lowest with Yorkshire and The Humber, of all English regions. Furthermore, the median
disposable weekly household income after housing costs in the East Midlands was £342, in the
three-year period 2007/08 to 2009/10, below the UK average (Office for National Statistics,
2012, Social Indicators, East Midlands).
Regional Summary
In essence, the UKIP vote could perhaps be viewed as the best metric for assessing
mainstream Euroscepticism in Great Britain. Parties meeting this mainstream designation are
those with at least one seat in the EU Parliament or House of Commons. As frequently
mentioned before, the UK has an overt tradition of Euroscepticism (Aspinwall 2000, p. 416;
Gifford, 2006, p. 852). The UKIP has traditionally performed better in second-order elections
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such as the previously mentioned EU Parliament Election and poorly in first order elections such
as the UK’s General Election. The reasons for the UKIP’s success in second-order elections are
not completely understood, but some point to the fact that most European voters, as well as
British voters, view the second-order elections, such as the EU Parliament Elections as less
consequential (Heath 1999, p. 389; Cutts, Ford and Goodwin, 2012, p. 204). To expand upon
this, turnout in the UK was only 35% in the 2009 EU Parliament elections whereas it was nearly
65% in the 2010 general elections (Electoral Commission, 2012).
These results partially reinforce the previously mentioned theories that voters seem to
view the EU Parliament elections as less consequential. Voters tend see these elections as an
opportunity to support smaller and more ideologically extreme minor parties. Under the
regionalist list proportional representation system (D’Hondt Method) that the EU Parliament
Elections employs, there is a greater likelihood that these votes will translate into seats for the
more minor parties. The D’Hondt method does slightly favor large parties, however not nearly as
much as the simple majoritarian system (first past the post). Unlike single transferable voting, it
does not use a quota or formula to allocate seats or posts. Instead, these are allocated singularly
and one after another. The basic premise is that a party's vote total is divided by a certain figure
which increases as it wins more seats. As the divisor becomes bigger, the party's total in
succeeding rounds gets smaller, allowing parties with lower initial totals to win seats. The divisor
in the first round is one (it has no effect), and thereafter it is the total number of seats gained plus
one (bbc.co.uk, 1999). Dissimilarly, minor parties suffer in first-order elections under the
majoritarian system which severely penalizes parties that lack a geographically concentrated
base of support, such as the UKIP (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2012, p. 210). The majoritarian
system allocates seats to parties with a simple plurality of the vote and is employed in local
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council and general elections for the House of Commons in the UK.
In an extensive study of the 2009 EU Parliament Election, researchers at the University
of Manchester and the University of Nottingham found that UKIP support is concentrated among
middle aged, financially insecure men with a Conservative background and is significantly
higher among the skilled working classes who have been most exposed to competition from the
European Common Market. UKIP supporters are also more likely than voters in general to
regularly read one of Britain’s Eurosceptic right-wing “tabloid” newspapers, although such
papers are also popular with supporters of the mainstream Conservative Party (Cutts, Goodwin
and Ford, 2012, p. 209). In the sample data collected, it was found that the average UKIP voter
was 55, seven years older than the average supporter of the other three major UK political
parties. These findings were in line with support for the UKIP in South West England, as this
was the oldest region and the best region for the UKIP. There is a very strong positive correlation
(r= 0.86, n=11, p<0.05) between percentage of population age 65 or older and UKIP support by
region. The southern regions of England have the highest percentages of people over the age of
65 and tend to poll as the most anti-EU in surveys, as well as being the best regions for the UKIP
in the 2009 UK EU Parliament election.
Ultimately, there exists a subtle divide between BNP support in the North of England and
UKIP support in the South. There is also an obvious lack of support for any sort of right-wing
anti-EU parties in Scotland and overall lower levels of voter preference for anti-EU parties than
anywhere else in Great Britain. In England, Euroscepticism in lowest in London, a melting pot of
hundreds of cultures. It is moderately high in the East Midlands, typically fervent Labour North
of England and conservative South and highest in the West Midlands and Yorkshire and the
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Humber where UKIP and BNP support is deeply entrenched within the regional political
structure.

Figure 4.11 Correlations Matrix for England
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4.2 Local Results in Depth

As previously discussed, a different set of political circumstances exists within Scottish
and Welsh local politics. England is a much different case however. This study examined the
most recent Welsh and Scottish local government elections, 2008 and 2007 respectively, as well
as English local elections that occurred from 2007 to 2010. This brief section will be focus on
analysis of English local elections but disregard Welsh and Scottish local elections. It is not
arbitrary but due to one basic element. The BNP and UKIP rarely achieved even one percent of
the vote in all Scottish and Welsh council elections. The best result for either party was a mere
3.6% for the BNP in Swansea. Only three times did either party achieve more than 1 % of the
vote, all of these instances occurred in Wales. In England, there are a total of 326 local
government districts. These districts elect local councils in varying years. Depending upon the
type of local government (Unitary Authority, Metropolitan Borough, etc.), local councils are
elected in thirds every three years or the entire council is up for election every four years.
From a statistical standpoint, there is a great deal of variation between support for
Eurosceptic candidates in the EU Parliament elections and support for them in local council
elections. The average combined vote for both the UKIP and BNP in local elections was nearly
6% while the average result for the national EU election was nearly 25%. These results appear to
reinforce the often discussed theory that voters tend to view EU elections as less consequential.
EU Parliament elections are occasionally termed second-order (Leconte, 2010; Reif and Schmitt,
1980, p. 5) and often display more extremist voting trends. A paired two sample for means t-test
indicates a significant variation between the combined total for BNP and UKIP support at the
national level and the local level (t(325) = 55.25, p<0.001). The reason for this variation may
also be more obvious and simplistic. Perhaps voters view local councilors as inconsequential in
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the European Union decision making process. Voters could potentially view EU members of
Parliament as more involved in the actual politics of the European Union as opposed to local
councilors who obviously hold much less sway over international relations. If the British public
is highly Eurosceptic, it would stand to reason that voters would view EU elections as a more
effective outlet for this frustration, as opposed to local elections where international issues are
rarely at the forefront.
Another theory argues that voters sometimes see these European elections as a way to
vote sincerely rather than strategically for parties that more in line with their own interests, rather
than voting for larger parties that are less in line with their interests but have a greater chance of
forming a government (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). It is probable the UKIP and
BNP leadership do not seek to affect issues regarding Europe on a local level, but rather the
strategy behind fielding candidates in these elections lies in the fact that if elected, councilors
from these parties can gain the trust of citizens. If a citizen trusts a UKIP councilor, for example,
they might be more apt to vote UKIP in the EU Parliament Elections, and if they vote for them in
these elections, they might be more apt to vote for them in the General Elections.
The theory that rural voters are more prone to Euroscepticism also seems to hold true
(Boy and Chiche, 2005, p. 93), especially in the EU Parliament elections. There is a strong

inverse correlation (r= -0.51, n=326, p<0.05 ) between population density per hectare and
combined BNP and UKIP vote totals. The correlation is much weaker in local elections
0.23, n=326, p<0.05) but nonetheless still exists. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 below show the
geographic distribution of the vote in the EU Parliament elections and local elections
respectively.
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Figure 4.12 Local BNP and UKIP Vote Returns in the 2009 EU Parliament Election
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Figure 4.13 BNP and UKIP Support by District in Local Elections 2007-2010
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In general, areas with very high levels of Eurosceptic voting in local council elections
also had very high levels in the EU election. Similar to the national EU Parliament election, the
West Midlands again had the highest combined BNP and UKIP mean local vote at 7.7%.
However, the difference between the local and national means was highest in this region with a
23% point difference between national and local support for the two parties and the lowest mean
difference occurred in London with a 14.1% point difference. This result was interesting as the
West Midlands region was the most Eurosceptic voting region and London was the least.
Statistically speaking, London was the region where support for the hard Eurosceptic parties in
local and national elections varied the least, whereas the West Midlands was the region where it
varied most. Councils in the East, East Midlands and South East showed the second highest local
mean vote at 7.3%, 6.2% and 7% respectively. The second tier of support occurred in the North
East, North West, South West and Yorkshire and the Humber at 4%, 5.3%, 5.2% and 4.8%
respectively. London was by far the least supportive of these two parties lending only 1.1% of
the vote to them in the 2010 London local elections.
In local government elections, age was again positively correlated with Eurosceptic
voting (r= 0.22, n=326, p<0.05). Moreover, similar to national correlations, the more White
British the population is, the more likely they are to vote for Eurosceptic candidates. However,
the correlation was weaker in national elections (r= 0.25, n=326, p<0.05). In no council
elections did the combined UKIP and BNP support exceed the combined EU Parliament election
total. The closest these two parties came to equaling their support in the EU Parliament election
was 2.6% points in the district of Newcastle-under-Lyme in the West Midlands region. Based
upon voting data, Newcastle-under-Lyme was the single most Eurosceptic council in all of
England. Furthermore, it was the only council where the parties obtained more than one-third of
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the electorate in both local and national elections.
Some anomalous areas sprouted upon the map as well. In four council areas, Breckland,
Northeast Lincolnshire, North Warwickshire, and Tamworth, the BNP and UKIP had no
councilors from either party on the ballot thus receiving no votes in local elections, although
these councils all contributed nearly one-third of the vote total to the previously mentioned
parties in the 2009 EU Parliament election. In 36 council areas, the UKIP and BNP offered no
candidates on ballots in the local elections and received a combined final average of 21.5% of
the vote total in the EU Parliament elections in these same areas.
Another interesting case was the district of South Lakeland in the county of Cumbria in
the North West of England. Outside of London and a few other councils in the south of England,
South Lakeland was one of the few areas where BNP and UKIP support was abnormally low in
both local and national elections. Here, the combined total in the EU Parliament election was
under 15% and the local election combined total for the parties was less than 1%. South
Lakeland was one of only 25 councils where this sort of result occurred with 18 of this 25
occurring in London. South Lakeland is interesting in that it has a very old population, with 32%
of the population over the age of 60 compared with the national average of 22%, (Office for
National Statistics, 2011, Census Data) and is overwhelmingly White British (In June 2007,
0.7% were Mixed Race, 0.8% Asian or Asian British, 0.4% Black or Black British, and 0.6%
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group. This is 2.5% altogether, compared to 11.7% nationally,
Southlakeland.gov.uk). Previous findings in this work indicate ethnicity and age are strongly
correlated with support for far-right and anti-EU parties. South Lakeland seems to go against
these trends.
Aside from most boroughs of London, the cities of Oxford and Cambridge were two
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other prominent localities that consistently supported the UKIP and BNP in much lower numbers
than virtually every other council in England. These cities host world renowned institutions of
higher education (University of Oxford and University of Cambridge) and are both within the top
fifteen most educated regions of Great Britain with Oxford at number two and Cambridge at
number thirteen. Combined support for both parties in the EU Parliament election was roughly
10% in both districts, while support in local elections was much lower at 2.7% and 0.005%
respectively. The results here are not surprising, since education is strongly positively correlated
(r= 0.61, n=326, p<0.05) between those who have no qualifications and combined UKIP and
BNP support.
In terms of theories proposing the economically disadvantaged are more apt to vote for
Eurosceptic parties, only BNP support seems to show a strong correlation. The key variable
“unemployment rate age 16-64” was recorded for every local authority during the 2011 Census
of England and Wales. When tested against the combined results for the BNP and UKIP in local
elections, the correlation is negligible (r= 0.07, n=326, p<0.05). BNP support shows a strong
positive correlation (r= 0.40, n=326, p<0.05) with percentage of unemployed by local authority.
This reinforces previous findings that indicate disadvantaged populations might be more prone to
far-right voting. Curiously however, when tested against vote returns from each local authority in
the EU Parliament election, the correlation is much weaker (r= 0.12, n=326, p<0.05). This result
conflicts with past research indicating disadvantaged populations are more likely to vote for
parties with a fascist message (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers 2004). In both local and
national elections, UKIP support showed a weak inverse correlation with the percentage of
unemployed residents age 16-64 by local authority in England.
From a political perspective, there is an interesting correlation between Labour Party-
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BNP support and Conservative-UKIP support. There appears to be a weak positive relationship
between UKIP support and Conservative party support in the EU Parliament elections. Areas
with higher rates of conservative party support also have higher rates of UKIP support. The
correlation was fairly weak (r= 0.24, n=326, p<0.05) but nonetheless shows a positive correlation
between support for these parties. The Conservative-UKIP correlation is in line with previous
research that indicates conservative voters often support the UKIP in European elections as a
method of protesting further European integration. Since the Conservative party can be seen as
soft Eurosceptic, it would stand to reason that core Conservative party supporters might use the
EU election as an opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the sometimes ambivalent
Conservative stance on EU integration, and instead support the hard Eurosceptic UKIP.
However, the most unusual statistical correlation here is the relationship between Labour
and BNP support. At first glance, one might not expect to find a strong correlation between
support for the leading left-wing pro EU party in Great Britain and the far-right, borderline
fascist BNP. Yet when analyzing local council election returns from the EU Parliament election,
there exists a strong positive correlation between these parties (r= 0.48, n=326, p<0.05).
Superficially, a relationship between BNP and Labour Party support was unexpected, but from a
cultural geography perspective it is not. As mentioned in the previous section on regional results,
BNP support is much stronger in the north of England than the south. The Labour Party
generally exceeded its national average in the north, while this region was also the highest for
BNP support. The north is much more industrial and blue collar in nature than the south, thus the
north has always been a stronghold for trade unions and general Labour Party support. The BNP
has specifically targeted working class voters discontented with current Labour Party policies.
Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2010, p. 420) found that BNP supporters are most likely to have been
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drawn from Labour Party family backgrounds.
As formerly discussed, the 2009 “shire” county elections and eight other unitary authority
elections occurred concurrently with the 2009 EU Parliament election. When voters chose local
councilors in these elections, they also chose members of European Parliament from their region.
Therefore, the results from these elections could be said to be the most accurate comparison
between the local council results and EU Parliament results. In the 27 shire counties, there were a
total of 201 districts observed, while the eight unitary authorities are treated as single political
entities for a grand total of 209 observations out of 326 districts for all of England (66% of local
councils). In these elections, the mean vote for the national returns was 25.3%, virtually the same
as the cumulative results, whereas the local elections saw a mean of 7%, one point higher than
the cumulative totals.
There was less variation here between local and national results for the BNP and UKIP
than when all of England is compared between local and national results (t(208) = 43.71,
p<0.001 (shire county elections); t(325) = 55.25, p<0.001[all of England]), indicating voters in
the shire counties selecting UKIP or BNP candidates in national elections, were more likely to
do so for local council elections. However, it does not appear that there was much psychological
effect or political pull associated with voting for both national Eurosceptic candidates and local
Eurosceptic candidates. In other words, as evidenced by the mean vote of 7% in local elections
and 25.3% in national elections, the added importance of selecting EU Parliament members
concurrently with local council members does not make voters more likely to support
Eurosceptic candidates.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The findings in this study generally support past literature on the nature and geography
of Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism in Great Britain generally follows a trend seen elsewhere
throughout Europe. The more educated, wealthy, and urban citizens tend to view Euroscepticism
as a negative philosophy whereas the more rural, older and less educated citizenry see it as a
positive political force for preserving their unique British way of life. The Eurosceptic parties
appear to have a so called “catch all” political effect on British politics. On the one hand, the
UKIP appears to be a fine alternative for the more mainstream conservative voter in the south of
England looking to express their contempt for further EU integration whereas the far-right BNP
appears to have the unusual effect of siphoning off disgruntled working class voters who
typically support the left leaning Labour Party in the more industrialized North.
In the future, the UKIP will be the more likely of the two parties to maintain widespread
support and secure its place in the mainstream permanently. BNP rhetoric seems to be too
inflammatory for the party to secure a lasting place in mainstream British politics. Putting the
party’s recent successes, particularly in the north, aside, it would seem many of the party’s
current supporters will switch to the UKIP. The recent economic slowdown in Britain has
stemmed the tide of immigration substantially in all areas outside of London. The issue of
immigration will eventually subside, and the BNP will likely lose any traction gained from this
controversial topic. The geographical heartland of Eurosceptic voting will likely remain
concentrated in the Midlands belt of England. This region is the most dissatisfied with EU
policies, and no apparent economic opportunities appear to be heading to these regions. As such,
no major demographic changes are likely to occur here, and the core Eurosceptic voting bloc in
this region will remain indefinitely. Likewise, the South West is the oldest region and only
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getting older. UKIP support is very high among older Brits, and this region is the most rural of
all English regions. These two issues correlate very highly with Eurosceptic voting, so it does not
appear the voting character of the South West will change immediately.
The northern regions of England are still very industrial. Since the Labour party is very
popular among blue collar workers, it is likely Labour will remain a key player in EU elections.
Pro-EU sentiment is so unpopular in the UK right now that the Labour party will eventually have
to adopt some sort of Euroscepticism, presumably the soft kind. In a 2013 YouGov survey, only
43% of Labour supports replied that exiting the EU would be bad for the economy, whereas 42%
said it would be good or make no difference. A slight majority of 52% of Labour voters said the
government should hold a referendum on Britain’s EU membership and 34% replied they would
vote to exit the EU. With this in mind, it is likely the BNP will fall in the traditionally Labour
North and a new slightly anti-EU Labour government will enjoy high levels of support.
The wild card in English politics specifically remains the Conservative party. Whether or
not the Conservatives choose to adopt hard Eurosceptic policies remains to be seen. In all
likelihood, they will strengthen their anti-EU views in order to stop the UKIP from drawing core
Conservative voters. Should this happen, BNP and UKIP support will likely die down in the
Midlands regions and conservative South, and Conservative Party support will steadily increase
here. It appears the current Conservative Party leadership is poised to pivot further to a hard
Eurosceptic stance. Conservative Party leader and current Prime Minister David Cameron has
already promised a referendum by 2017 on Britain’s continued membership, indicating the Party
is already taking steps to reinvent itself as the vanguard of Eurosceptic politics in the UK.
London will likely remain pro-EU, but changes in British political culture could cause
slight increases in mixed feelings on EU membership. As a whole, the cosmopolitan nature of
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this region makes it likely that London will be the last English region that adopts an outright
negative view of further EU integration. When it comes to Wales and Scotland, Wales seems to
be much more in line with English views on EU membership. The Welsh likely feel
marginalized by England’s continued focus on continental Europe and will typically vote against
further EU involvement as a reminder to Westminster that they are still here and that there are
more pressing matters of attention on the isle of Great Britain. It could also be the case that the
Welsh identify more culturally with the English than the Scottish do. For this reason, the Welsh
may opt to vote similarly, to the English while the Scottish prefer a more independent voting
behavior. Furthermore, Haesly (2001, p.83) found out through detailed interviews that the
Scottish are considerably less Eurosceptic than the English since they less often have exclusive
national identity perceptions. They consider themselves Scottish, British and European, for
instance. Scotland is likely to remain pro-EU, especially if voters in the upcoming referendum
opt to secede from the United Kingdom. An independent Scotland’s potential place within the
EU could grant the country access to valuable EU funds and membership could strengthen the
SNP’s place within the politics of a newly independent Scotland.
The UK appears to be at a major crossroads. On the one hand, the nation needs to
maintain a close knit relationship with the EU for economic benefits, but the British population
at large seems to view Britain’s place on the international scene in different terms. The historical
dominance of the British Empire still resonates with many in Britain, and the UK’s increasing
marginalization within the EU by larger more powerful nations such as Germany make it
difficult to reconcile these differences. Increasing economic troubles in the Mediterranean seems
to be a major deterrent for deepening British involvement in the EU. Perhaps the less educated
and more rural, unconnected citizenry fear the EU, because they do not fully understand the
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intricacies of the global economy. Neil Fligstein (2008, p.218) identifies a “Euro-clash” in which
the 10% in society who are the economic elite are in favor of integration, the 30 or 40%
economically weak are against and the future of integration will be decided by the extent to
which the middle class can be convinced of either side to form a majority. Although the UK
stands to lose by bailing out the ailing Mediterranean nations, they stand to lose even more in the
broader economic picture by not aiding their fellow European brothers.
Future researchers could build upon this work substantially. As previously noted, a more
longitudinal study of Great Britain would paint a much clearer picture of the evolution of spatial
variations Eurosceptic voting. An analysis of media influence of Euroscepticism would help
understand the nature of this philosophy in Great Britain. Furthermore, the overall psychology of
Euroscepticism could be studied more so in future research. Understanding why the less
educated see further European integration as negative would provide a wealth of knowledge on
general mistrust of the European Union. Is the ethnic group conflict theory and perceived threats
by immigrants a normal part of the more primal nature of humans or is there some more complex
socio-economic issue that can be corrected by educational intervention? The immigration issue
in general could be analyzed in greater detail as well. This study only briefly looked at the issue
of immigration, but a more in depth study would certainly provide a better understanding of
Euroscepticism, more specifically the statistical data regarding immigration from other European
Union member states. Are ethnically “White British” citizens unemployed more often in areas
with more EU immigrants than areas that have fewer of the latter but more of the former?
Furthermore, data regarding EU funding by region or districts of England could be explored. Do
regions of Great Britain receive equal access to funds and if not do regions that receive less EU
funding have higher levels of Eurosceptic voting behavior? This point would likely be the most
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pertinent to future researchers as it is very obvious that those benefiting most from current EU
funds would ostensibly hold it in the highest regard.
Whatever the case may be, this thesis could serve as a policy reference for those seeking
to understand their constituents and the issues most affecting their support or opposition for the
European Union. If one were interested in how to improve views on the EU, this work could
serve as a reference for targeted information campaigns on the benefits of the EU in those
regions most opposed to it. Conversely, one seeking to further advance the causes of anti-EU
politics could use this work to rally and further empower those in the regions identified as most
Eurosceptic. In essence, this work is only a brief snapshot of the complexities of Eurosceptic
opinion and geographic distribution. Hopefully, this work could help a future scholar seeking to
understand how Euroscepticism manifests itself geographically and why some citizens are more
prone to it than others.
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